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Institute of History and International RelationsUniversity of Szczecin, PolandHadrian Ludwik KryskiewiczA Parthians of the 1st c.B.C - Worthy enemy of Rome? Comments on the issue of pro-Roman political conflict during the period of the end of the Roman Republic and its impact on Roman imperial ideology Summary: The article cites the widely understood theme of imperium romanum's external relations with the Arsacid monarchy in the 1st c.B.C, both in terms of the general concept of diplomatic encounters and the issue of military struggles between both powers during this period. From the first official embassy between Mr Cornelius Sulla and Orobazos (first decade of 1st c.B.C), With the defeat of M. Crassus's legions at Carrhae (53 B.C. Marcus Antony's Eastern Expedition (36 B.C), as far as Emperor Augustus's success in replacing lost Legionnaires' flags (20 B.C), the study focuses on the question of the possible situation and the image that the Parthians eventually developed in Roman imperial ideology as a result of the above historical events. Keywords: Rome, ideology, propaganda, imperialism, Middle East, 1st century B.C.In the 1st c.B.C., possibly - the 92- (Sykes, 1915: 365; Debevoise, 1938: 46; Ziegler, 1964: 20; Ball, 2002: 13) or perhaps (as some scholars claim) 96 B.C. (Badian, 1959; Badian, 1964: 157 ff.; Olshausen, 1972: 812; Keaveney, 1981; Letzner, 2000: 100; Wolski, 2003: 76), L. Cornelius Sulla - the governor of Cilicia at the time - had approached Orobazos, an emanator of the Parthian King Mithridates of the IInd great. The meeting was said to have been held somewhere in eastern Kappadokia , possibly the Armenian cities of Melitene and Tomisa (Ziegler, 1964: 20, abb. 2; Letzner, 2000: 1001, abb. 96) and presumably near the Euphrase River, as Plutarch speaks of Sulla's protracted banks while being interrupted by the Parthians ambassador (Plut. Sul. 5.4). While the proprator Sulla, as Plutarch suggests, came into the company of Ariobarzanes (i.e. the newly appointed ruler of Kappadokia), Orobazos is said to be wise (mage, as Velleius puts it, one, a Chaldean, subsequently promised great wealth to the Great Wealth of Rome (Plut. Sul. 5.5-6; Vell. Pat. II, 24.3; on Ariobarzanes (cf. The meeting itself has historically been recognized as the first meeting between Roman and Partic (Iranian) civilizations and cultures, which ultimately led to the establishment of preliminary diplomatic relations between the two powers (Dobiáš, 1931/1932: 221-223; Wolski, 1985: 226 f.; Dąbrowa, 2012: 30). Notabene, the pre-word was not used indirectly. As the ancient authors attest, Orobazos sought to discuss the (amicitia/philia) and perhaps even a kind of covenant (symmachia) to be introduced with Rome (Festus 15.2; Liv is crying. 70; Plut, it's not my fault. Sul. 5.4; Vell. Pat. II, 24.3). However, unlike the generally peaceful course of the initial embassies of Partaus and China (about 115 B.C.) - which provides further strengthening of friendly relations, as well as the improvement of mutual trade (Sykes, 1915: 365 f.; Ghirshman, 1978: 250) – The result of Sulla's meeting with Orobazos was, moreover, characterised by general mistrust, punishment and ambiguity of claims; a concept that was to forestreeh the impending rivalry (Ball, 2002: 13). To Sulla, either because of his personal characteristics or simply because he misinterpreted the Parthians, he responded in a seemingly haughty manner and perceived orobazos' offer as a mere tributary proposal, the effect of which would therefore have become another client state in Rome (Debevoise, 1938: 46). However, with the possibility of purely oral agreements, there is no solid room to reach a formal consensus between the Parthians and Rome. Furthermore, if we take into account the fact that a diplomatic treaty in Rome should have required the official approval of the Senate first, the latter option seems rather dubious, as we have no information that Sulla forwarded this petition to Rome after the negotiations (a move he did not hesitate to take after taking part in a similar mission in Numidia, 105B.C.) (Ziegler, 1964: 21-23). The Arsacid king soon replied and ordered the execution of his envoy. It is said that this was because Orobazos allowed himself to sit lower than the Roman REPRESENTATIVE during the negotiations - a symbolic shame on the authority of the Parthian ruler, that Plutarch meaningfully emphasizes his narrative (Plut. Sul. 5.4 f.). What is only the second (and perhaps more likely) reason for Orobazos's death sentence is that he, too, authorized the presence of King Ariobarzanes in the - ultimately trilateral - dispute. The above ruler was most likely perceived by the Parthians as an usurper, therefore a person who is unworthy of becoming an equal diplomatic side at the meeting. As far as Sulla's approach to the Partan case is concerned in general, it appears that it was also influenced by the more immediate issue of neighbouring Pontus and Armenia, whose policy posed a serious threat to the desires for further conquest in eastern Rome (Wolski, 1995: 56). The latter could also have become an important obstacle to the implementation of the Arsacids' plans for the Syrian coast. Therefore, the idea of Orobazos embassy in Sulla, therefore, created at least one temporary political counterweight to pontic-Armenian dominance in the region (Sykes, 1915: 366). In the eastern part of the Mediterranean theatre, the origin of the Roman presence that the empire's struggle with Hannibal in Carthage during the IInd Pun War (218-201 B.C.) and the series of conflicts with Philip the Vth macedoni that soon (Kucharczak, 1976: 42). The possibility of interference in Greece's affairs grew even further when Rome subdued the kingdom of Attalids - Pergamon - and soon after established a new province in Asia in 129 B.C. Ostrowski, 2005: 40). From then on, roman influence gradually expanded to the increasingly distant eastern parts of Ananofia, and ultimately includes the goal of full dominance of the Caspian Sea and the Syrian coasts. The fuel that propelled the prized commanders into the res publica throughout eastern campaigns, or - the essence of Roman imperialism, can be described shortly as a mixture of both prosaic causes common to the need for new lands, money, and the widely named riches of the East, as well as personal desires to garner military fame and glory (Erskine, 2010: 33-49, 62 ff.). In the late Republican period, however, the above palette could not yet be noticeably amplified, based on state ideology, and finally as the cradle of civilization (André, 1982: 56-72), which was intended to be dominus regum, victor atque imperator omnium gentium, as Cicero put it (Dom. 90). The above belief is obviously similar to the conclusion that the Romans are symbolically higher than other nations that live in the known Oikoumene, which is why Rome was to generally represent a condescending attitude - and the Parthians were no exception (Vogt, 1929: 12-13 f.). As far as the Arsacids and their eastern rule are concerned, we must bear in mind the highly subjective and limited scope provided by the legacy of Greco-Roman narrative resources (Wolski, 1979: 17-21; Dąbrowa, 2012: 21-25). Despite being contained in proposals, the Parthian state is actually focused on, and well-organized and capable government with absolute power (based on feudal-like social structures) - a characteristic that is hardly applicable to different tribes, many met with the Romans in northern Europe. What's more, the Parthians have managed to develop their own complex ideology, military, and cultural program, all all reaching all the way back to the legacy of Achaemenidian Persia; The title of King of kings (regularly used by Parthian rulers since Mithridates in the IInd) may be a meaningful consequence of imperial ambition among the Arsacids (Wolski, 1966). One of the main foundations of Partisan imperialism was the restoration of Darius's empire at its territorial climax (Wolski, 1976: 214). Significant progress has been made in fulfilling the above when it comes to kings: Mithridates of the 1st (ca. 171-138 B.C.), and his namesake, Mithridates of the IInd B.C.), has made considerable efforts to lead a large-scale military expansion (ca. 148-120 B.C.). The results included both: the conquest of Asia in the eastern Himalayas, and the establishment of Partic dominance in Mesopotamia – in the West (Sykes, 1915: 361 f.; Debevoise, 1938: 26, 40 ff.; Dąbrowa, 2005: 73-77, 85 f.). The next step would now be to firmly subjure the regions of neighbouring Armenia and Syria to provide a significant source of income from overseas trade (Syria) on the one hand, and to obtain a convenient geopolitical basis for any future military enterprise, either in terms of offensive or defence measures (Frye, 1962: 186 ff.; Wolski, 1976: 198-209; Wolski, 1980: 251, 253-255 f.). Although it had a completely different cultural origin and ideology, both Rome and Parthians had to share similar ambitions for dominance in the Middle East, both of which proved to be states of full size, and both were at the height of impressive territorial expansion around the time of Orobazos' mission to Sulla. As Warwick Ball sums it up: two brand new superpowers bending outward muscles, one claiming the mantle of Alexander and the other by cape Cyrus, both meeting face-to-face with the Euphrases, which formed the boundary. All it needed was a spark to ignite the inevitable (Ball, 2002: 13). For now, however, the wave of direct confrontation has yet to be postponed. The 1st c.B.C.C.C. Keaveney, 1998: 111 ff.). During the mithridatic wars, from 89 to B.C, the Parthians empire was eventually introduced as vigilant, albeit mainly as an observer of conflict on its western borders. This policy was motivated in part by the fact that Arsacids at the time had lost in one of several turbulent periods of internal unrest and rebellion. This: starting about as early since the death of Mithridates in IInd (87 B.C.), the very ascension of King Phraates in IIndr (approx. 71/70-58/57 B.C.) (Olbrycht, 2009: 164-170 f.). It should be stressed that dynastic struggles overall were a significant weakness in the history of ancient Iran during the reign of Arsacid, although still - not as great as the ancient Greco-Roman authors exaggerated. It would be over-simple to say that Rome's impending successes in the Mithridatic Wars were somehow omitted by his new eastern neighbor, towards whom the Empire's borders were already rapidly approaching each other. The Arsacids probably had excellent intelligence. a significant fact which has not been manifested on several occasions (Olbrycht, 1998: 140). Furthermore, regardless of the internal instability of the period, the circle of Middle Eastern Parthians is likely to have persisted, both for rulers Iudea, Commagene and perhaps for distant Arabia, who were all the more favourable to Arsacid policy the closer it came to creating Roman superiority in the region (Debevoise, 1938: 94; Wolski, 1995: 58 f.; Wheeler, 2007: 240 f.). Finally, the Parthians have even successfully struggled to preserve their propaganda image on a strong side of the ongoing Western conflict by engaging in diplomatic talks with both M. Lucullus and Cn. Pompeius (see Plut. Splendor. 76.4) Sometime during their eastern campaigns, the 60.ties(Sykes, 1915: 371; Keaveney, 1981: 203 ff.; Keaveney, 1998: 127). As can be assumed from the Roman perspective, only a little of the above influenced the general comment on the Part-State; In the Romans' worldview, Parthians are likely to still maintain the position of a remote andimprecase nation, lying somewhere in the Far East, which does not really pose a serious threat to the plans of the empire for further conquest in that theater. Antagonism soon resurfaced, pompey the great crowned his achievements in roman expansion in the Middle East, and this: first – armenia's subject in B.C 66, then – Syria and Judas 64/63 B.C (Kucharczak, 1976: 51 f.; Dąbrowa, 1986: 94-96). The above have been achieved, Rome's eyes can now also be transferred to the government organization of the newly acquired provinces, while the empire's ambitions can stretch even further east, into the lands of Mesopotamia and India (mostly recognized as the legendary conquest in the hands of one of Rome's most valuable, and all, while looking up idols or heroes, Alexander the Great). Therefore, in B.C 55, A. Gabinius, since Syria proconsulja AB57B .C. – became one of the first Romans (after Lucullus and Pompey) to ever cross the Euphrates in an attempt to establish a Roman military presence in Mesopotamia(App. Syr. 51.; Cic IV. Dio XXXIX, 56.3; Jos. AJ XIV, 6.2 (98); Jos. I'm Dr. Bell. Jud. I, 8.7 (175-176)). However, the simultaneous opportunity to intervene in Ptolemeicmatters in Egypt, eventually gabinius withdraws from the Euphrates theater (Sampson, 2008: 94-98, 103 ff.). And yet another, far more and ambitious military enterprise was bound to follow: the expedition of M. Licinius Crassus to the riches of the east (if not exactly India). The circumstances, the course, and the end result of the campaign, are all well-explored topics by scientists (Smith, 1916; Timpe, 1962; Ball, 2002: 13, 114 f.; Kane, 2008; Sampson, 2008). Crassus expedition (54-53 B.C.), as can be inferred, in particular in the greed, and his supposed desire to follow in the footsteps of Alexander the Great in his own great conquest of the East (thus surpassing both Pompey's, and Julius Caesar's military achievements) ended in total disaster, with more than 20,000 soldiers killed (including Crassus) and another 10,000 legions captured by the Parthians cavalry, the Battle of Carrhae by B.C (Smith), 1916: 237, 260 f.; Scullard, 2011: 105 f.). By all accounts, defeat has become a historic breakthrough: if not so much in the issues of military tactics as in the Roman attitude towards the Partans (Sykes, 1915: 379 f.; Sampson, 2008: 83 f.; Scullard, 2011: 106). We have reason to believe that the Carrhae disaster has significantly affected Roman worldviews about the Middle East, and the Arsacid state is now one of Rome's deadliest enemies, like having an empire so large and so contrecting with so many nations that it almost caricatured with the greatness of the Romans, because only Strabo (Strab). XI 9.2.cf. Dio XL, 14.3-4; Herodian IV, 10.2 f.; Only, XLI, 1.1. Unfortunately, as Józef Wolski once noted, Rome's policy of easy conquest in the East definitely ended the era of Pompey at large (Wolski, 1994: 89). The Battle of Carrhae revealed the art of Parthian warfare, essentially based on the cooperation of two cavalry branches: the light weapons of highly trained horse archers, the so-called Pelatai, and the heavy armed cavalry, the so-called Cataphract troops, which together are capable of inflicting devastating damage on the enemy (Mielczarek, 1993: 42 f.). The outcome of confrontation 53 B.C also indicated the need to improve the full range of combat tactics used by the Romans, although it does not appear to have had a decisive impact on the overall structure of the imperial army (Wheeler, 2007: 263). While the extent of the losses at Carrhae , the largest since attancae (216 B.C), and one of the most powerful games in the history of the Roman army, may have been interpreted in the Eternal City as a kind of bitter military disgrace, but the fact that the excess (signa) of the enlisted flags (signa) was simultaneously captured, while the Romans (Wissemann , 1982: 4-10 ff. , 35-45, 63 f.). The effort to recover from there the lost standards, as well as with the aim of wreatsing Crassus's shame at the conquest of the Arsacid kingdom, was to serve as the decisive propaganda concept for all the upcoming campaigns against the Parthians over the course of the next few centuries, and all the while - a necessary step to bring about imperium romanum to finally achieve the dreamed world's dominance (Mastino, 1986: 79, 97 , 102 f.). As much as the surviving historiographic sources of the Roman side emphasize the Carrhae disaster, in these sources similarly detailed mentions from ancient writers that the Parthians most likely also suffered a grave shame due to M. Crassus's campaign. The thorough plundering of the city of Zenodion (Cohen, 2013: 90) and roman troops on the northwestern border of Mesopotamia in the municipality of B.C.5tel could have had significant consequences for the temporary loss of power that Partija probably held among the rulers of the various neighboring states (Debevoise, 1938: 81 ff.; Wolski, 1995: 58). Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the official mistreatment previously received at the hands of Sulla and Pompey, easily forgotten by the Partic rulers (Sykes, 1915: 371, 381; Timpe, 1962: 114-116; Scullard, 2011: 106). The successive political and military events that followed in the coming years are a good indication that the Battle of Carrhae may historically be approached as an event that marks the beginning of partisan military offensives against Roman wealth in the Middle East. Led by Crown Prince Pacorus – son of the current King Of Parthians, Orodes of IInd (ca. 57-38 B.C.) - the Arsacid army was to cross the Euphrase and invadeRoman Syria, causing significant damage there - firstly, probably even 53B.C., and secondly: only two years later, 51B.C. Ad fam. XV, 1) when the Parthians cavalry managed to severely plunder the city of Antioch (Dio XL, 38-40). However, the upcoming news of yet another dynastic plot to uncover the King's Orodes court (50 B.C.), has made Pacorus eventually withdraw from further raids on the Syrian coast, at least for the time being (Sykes, 1915: 380 f.). Pacorus's business , which was probably developed as a marauding campaign and perhaps an effort to symbolically emphasize the region's Partisan dominance of power, was essentially made possible thanks to the great rift that the loss of Crassus's legions actually created in the Roman defence system. But still, until the very IInd c. AD (!), the Romans failed to develop any significant form of military reserve, or any additional lines of strategic fortifications against barbarians along with the outlying limes. Because of the above, any significant military defeat, either in the Republican or later Roman imperial period, caused legitimate anxiety (if not fear) among the people of the Empire (Campbell, 2004: 78; Ostrowski, 2005: 48). In the closest months following Crassus's defeat, they did not seem to be abandoned against Syrian Parthians, but the local city garrisons and legionnaires' remains under the command of Quaesor C. Cassius Longinus (who had barely escaped death in Carrhae before) (Smith, 1916: 261-262). The threat to Syria is far from over. You probably have a positive opinion of societies Armenia, Syria and Iudea, as well as effectively exploiting the capable intelligence network in his possession, the Arsacid king patiently waited for the next available opportunity to strike by forcing force against the Roman enemy. Thus, it remains a significant fact that soon after Rome was to enter a period of severe internal unrest and political turmoil, known as civil war between the Caesarean section and the optimates of the years 44-42 B.C., came to nothing but exactly Parthians that quickly began: firstly - orderly prepare (since 44B.C.) and soon after launching a large-scale offensive (about 10,000 strong) , 40 B . . In the spring of C. The initiative - conducted again under the direction of Pacorus - could indeed be perceived in terms of strategic counter-action that forested Marcus Antony's own plans to wage war against Parthians at the time. According to Cassius Dio, Pacorus' attack still caught Antony in Alexandria, completely unprepared (Dio XLVIII, 24, 6-8). Yet before the invasion, the Partic King Orodes of the IInd managed to establish diplomatic treaties with the conspirators (Brutus and Cassius), apparently offering military support, while actually securing the interests of the widely named control over the Syrian coasts of the process (App. Bell. civ. IV, 59 et IV, 88). Furthermore, as one of the efforts of Parthian diplomacy, General Q. Labienus, formerly an emanating from King Orodes on behalf of Brutus and Cassius (Dio XLVIII, 24.4-5), played an important role in the previous invasion of the Parthians and was ordained as the Parthic imperator (commander of the Parthians), while aiding Pacorus and his army in his plans (Dio XLVIII , 26.5; I'm Strab. XIV, 2.24-25. Plut, it's not my fault. Ant 28.1). The campaign began when Pacorus was quickly deployed to Syria and the region of Palestine, where the pro-party Antigonus was deployed to replace Herod (Dio XLVIII, 26.2). Meanwhile, encountering but little resistance, Labienus set off with other Parthians forces toward Anallya. In the end, he managed to conquer an impressive part of Little Asia, including the provinces of Cilicia and Lydia.' Ant 30.2). Furthermore, there are rooms which may believe that Labienus' authority by that time was bithynian on the south coast of the Black Sea, in Bithynia (cf. XII, 8.9). Otherwise, the Partic cavalry troops made it to the west, all the way to the coasts of Caria and the Ien Sea. In it, they probably ransacked the cities of Alabanda in Mylasa, and may have even witnessed it in Ephesus (Dio XLVIII, 26.3-4; I'm Strab. XV,2,24 f.; Tac. Ann. III, 62.2) too! As Józef Wolski noted, Arsacids were never as close to fulfilling the chaemenid dream as they were in the last decade of the forties in 1st c.B.C. (Wolski, 1994: 90). Still, the Partus Empire ended up not at the time. From Asia Small (B.C. 39) and Pacorust, the hands of General Q. Ventidius Bassus were in the battle on the plains of Gindaros, B.C 38 (pacorus was killed). Nevertheless, the fact alone of such a prominent or well-thought-out political and military initiative come to life on behalf of Orodes of the IInd, continues (Ostrowski, 2005: 46). Yet Pacorus's campaign and Partisan success in Anantia brought rome another great embarrassment — the Mediterranean theatre did not witness such a military exodus on behalf of the Empire in its conflict with Hannibal in Carthage, Rome (Wolski, 1995: 59). And even further emphasize the presence of the Arsacid kingdom in the general concept of Roman political affairs during the period, it should be recalled that it was once again proven to be Parthians that was to become the ultimate, although in fact never realized the goal of conquest of Julius Caesar's great eastern expedition, preparing perhaps all the way back to 46-45 B.C. The dictator's tragic death b.C in 44 prevented the initiative from coming to life (Malitz , 1984). A few years later, it seemed to be the same Parthians towards which Mark Antony turned the blade in yet another military campaign to avenge Crassus's shame (36 B.C.). It remains a significant fact that Antony's undertaking was previously recognized as not less, but the official obligation of triumvir a ti n s [underl. author], which was adopted by Octavianus and Ms Lepidus 40B. Under part of the Brundisium Treaty signed in C (Brun, 1971: 498). Antony's partus adventure, however, despite the fact that all of the entées of 16 legions were accumulated by the army (twice as many, as Caesar invaded Gaul!) — however, it ended in the same way as crassus's business in 53 B.C. thousands of Roman soldiers were killed or wounded, the precious Legionnaires' flags again captured him, and Antony himself suffered a significant decline in popularity (Sherwin-White, 1984: 311-321; Dąbrowa, 2006: 323-325, 349 f.). As history has proven, sometimes the essence of man's failure will be best encapsulated as he then celebrates his long-awaited retribution. For partus, the above law can also be confirmed. In 20.B.C, Emperor Augustus managed to recover the prisoners and lost norms from Crassus and Antony's unfortunate expeditions. What's more, Augustus reached above in a rare, peaceful and diplomatic manner, as an emanating from Tiberius, as the emanating to King Phraates of Iwth (ca. 37-2 B.C.), and while also as mediator in the turbulent Armenian case (cf. Dio LIV, 9.4-5; Jos. AJ XV, 105; RG XXVII, 2; I'm Strab. XVII, 1.54; Tac. Ann. II, 3; Vell. Pat. II, 94.4. As for the widely named outcome of the return of standards, not to mention the following, it summons Paul Zanker, one of the most of these days are well-respected art and ideology historians from the Augustan era. As he notes, this event [i.e. the ensigns recovery] was endowed with an extraordinary significance [...] It was considered as one of the prerequisites for the opening of the Golden Age [a propaganda myth created by the Augusta peace, vitality and prosperity]. But at the same time, the celebration of this triumph materialized with a new concept of victory, which saw the ruler as the invulnerable winner and guarantor of the world order (Zanker, 1988: 183 f.). Shortly after 20 B.C., the victory arc was set up in Rome to commemorate the restoration standards, as well as the symbolic motif the kneeling Parthians had popularized - among other things - the various numismatic mints of the Roman Empire coinage. Furthermore, a magnificent and imposing statue called the Augustus prima porta, came to bear the important references to the Parthians' victory, carved on the front side of the statue armor. And yet to say, last but not least - the triumph of the Parthians has been allegorically immortalized in various works of Augustian literature, from Horace's Ode's and Letters, through Ovidia Fasti and Sextus Propertius elegies, as far as the epic Aeneid, author of Virgil himself (Debevoise, 1938: 140-144; Rose, 2005). The above only shows the important role played by reducing the shame suffered against the Parthians for the Roman public (or the Roman elite) at the time, and what official potential actually lied to a person who successfully drove out such a military strike (Merriam, 2004: 57-59 f.). It should also be noted that, from a political point of view, Rome's relations with the Partic state during Augustus rule generally had to be kept calm (yet maintained) at diplomatic level, while the Partan border overall showed no signs of unstable (Ziegler, 1964: 45-57, 82-96; Timpe, 1975). Both the recovery of the Ensigns, the temporarily stable status of the troubled Armenia case (and the poliitcal direction of the rulers) and the lack of further known military offensives on the Syrian coast in the Arsacid kingdom, which eventually marked the Phraates in the reign of the IVth (especially in the final years). A similar reason seems to be why Phraates later sent his four sons to the Roman court of Augustus , as confirmed by the maintenance of a peaceful neighborly policy between the two states (ca. 10 B.C.) (Ziegler, 1964: 51.1; Dąbrowa, 1987: 64 ff.). Although dynastic fighting in Parthians at the turn of the centuries discussed was heavily whraited by its ability to actively forge political influence in Syria as well as the Caucasus, arsacids actually did their best to renounce further rivalry with Rome because of imperial dominance in the Middle East. Armenia's case was to continue to play a key role in the general course of the Arsacid policies in the later period as well, while 'the Parthians' rulers have yet to demonstrate their ability to conduct effective military campaigns in order to restore the former province of political domination - leaving Armenia as Partia's westernmost buffer zone (Olbrycht, 1998: 121-134 ff. , 150 f., 154). From a Roman point of view, however, despite Augustus' symbolic and diplomatic victory in the 20 B.C. with its symbolic and diplomatic victory, the possibility of military vengeance was still a seduction of Roman minds and could be left as a legacy of the emperors of the future to sustain and ultimately fulfill (campaigns of Emperor Trajan and Septimus Severus).\*\*\*As can be inferred from the general events of 1st c.B.C., The Parthians proved to be a formidable and well-organized opponent of the Imperium Romanum, despite their first appearances , which has the power and workforce of dominance in the Middle East. this came because they regarded such an expedition as an easy way to increase their authority or keep public opinion in Rome somehow different busy, but they also do so most likely because: the victory of the Parthian empire at the time has increasingly been seen as an integral part of Roman imperial ideology. The Arsacid Empire probably symbolized the broadly understood wealth and mystery of the East, but since Crassus's campaign it has increasingly reminded me of the defeat of the Roman legions. Augustus' propaganda success in B.C 20 clearly underlines the position that the Parthians actually assumed in ancient Roman worldviews. From an as-yet unknown and underrated nation from Sulla's time, they quickly transformed into a fierce, all-out Roman adversary among all the barbaric nations they met in the East. Rivalry with Parthians over the Armenian and Syrian cause was that from there it would become an integral part of Rome's overarching policies in the Middle East, while the dream of mesopotamian conquest was to tickle the aspirations of many future emperors, from Nero and Trajan, to Severus, Caracalla and beyond. LIST OF JOURNAL ABBREVIATIONS:AJA - American Journal of ArchaeologyAJPH - American Journal of PhilologyANRW - Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung (hours. W. Haase, H. Temporini)You're an archiver. - Archivorientkap - Kwartalnik HistorycznyWJA - Würzburger Jahrbücher für die AltertumswissenschaftBIBLIOGRAPHY:ANCIENT SOURCES:Appian, The Wars in Syria,ca. [in:] Appian Roman history, ed. H. White, vol. II, London-Cambridge 1962.Appian, The Civil Wars [Bellum civile] [in:] Appian's Roman history, ed. H. White, vol. IV, 1961.(M. Tullius) Cicero, Epistulae, ed. L.C. Purser, vol. II, pt. 1, Oxford 1940. (New York City) Cicero, The Letters, ed. E. S. Shuckburgh, Vol. II, London 1899. (New York City) Cicero, The Orations [Orationae], ed.C. D. Yonge, London 1891.Cassius Dio, Roman History [Historia Romana], ed. E. Cary, vol. III, V-VI, Cambridge-London-New York 1914-55. (New Year's) Festus, Breviarum rerum gestarum populi Romani, ed. R. Mecenate, Roma 1819.Lucius Annaeus Florus, Epitomae de Tito Livio, ed.C. 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